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"Corporate America is very good at electing their people. If it's good for them, why can't it be good for us?" -New Jersey State AFL-CIO President Charles Wowkanech (Perez-Pena 2010) .
This study calls attention to a neglected effect of unions -they help members rise to elected public office -and assesses its magnitude empirically. This role of unions is part of larger debates over the promise and perils of union political influence playing out in Wisconsin and elsewhere (Mullans and McKinnon 2010, Greenhouse 2011) . On one side is concern that unions use political influence to bend policy to serve their own special interests at the expense of the public interest. This concern is particularly salient regarding public-sector unions. The other side views union political influence generally and members serving in public office as socially constructive for three primary reasons: to help unions act as a counter-weight to the policy influence of organized capital; to improve the quality of legislatures' deliberations through increased diversity; and to promote members' personal development.
Developing quantitative evidence on the extent to which unions help members rise to elected office is challenging. Using publicly available information, researchers cannot reliably and consistently observe whether a particular elected official has belonged to a union or not. Elected officials choose whether or not to advertise this fact. A failure to report may indicate either nonmembership or political inconvenience. Furthermore, because the probability of any particular person being elected to office is very low, one needs to study large populations.
Given these constraints, what ideal experiment would one like to run to test the theory that unionization causes office holding among members? Take multiple polities that each contains an identifiable group of potential candidates for office. In each polity, randomly assign members of the identifiable group to have a particular unionization rate. Later, observe whether or not members of the group hold a greater share of public offices where they were more unionized.
This thought experiment helps to clarify the current study's research question and the strengths and weaknesses of its design. A cross-section of the 50 U.S. states are the multiple polities.
Occupations define the identifiable groups of potential candidates with various levels of unionization. This study focuses on people in three public sector occupations -K-12 teachers, 5 police officers, and fire fighters -and one private sector occupation, construction workers. The outcome is the occupational share of state legislative seats held. For example, given that teachers are more highly unionized in Minnesota than Mississippi, are Minnesota legislators more likely to be teachers than Mississippi legislators? While unionization rates vary across states and occupations, they are obviously not randomly assigned. This raises the possibility of omitted variables that could drive both occupational unionization and electoral success for a given state-occupation, as well as possible reverse causality, whereby a given occupation having more electoral success in a state leads to greater unionization. To address these concerns, the analysis conditions on observed state differences and, in some specifications, uses state fixed effects to remove unobserved state differences that are common across the four occupations.
How Unions Support Members' Rise to Public Office
Unions may help their members rise to public office through three key processes. First, individual members may develop their personal skills as political leaders by participating in the internal organizational life of the union. Union members have chances to build leadership and political skills as they participate in the life of the organization (Quaglieri 1988; Eaton 1995; Nesbitt 2001) . They gain valuable and, for some, rare experience making collective decisions, using parliamentary procedure, bargaining for high stakes, engaging in public speech and persuasion, and building coalitions to seek internal union office. This experience builds necessary skills for public leadership. Second, because unions pursue members' collective objectives in the larger community through politics and policy, unions facilitate and encourage policy engagement by members. Once bitten by the bug, some members feel compelled to seek a larger role. Third, if an individual member wants to run for public office, her own union and the broader local labor movement serve as a base from which to launch a campaign.
While each of these three processes has been described to some extent by previous research, they have not been linked together as precursors to members' public office holding nor have prior studies attempted to quantify the effect of unions on office holding among members. In a qualitative account of the Los Angeles Central Labor Council, Frank and Wong (2004) describes the phenomenon anecdotally and discusses how it fits into a broader political strategy. There is 6 also a lot of work on the economic effects of unions (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Lewis 1986; Addison and Hirsch 1989; DiNardo and Lee 2004; Hirsch 2004; Mas and Lee 2009 ) and on unions' political roles in mobilizing voters Radcliff and Davis 2000; Freeman 2003; Zullo 2008; Lamare 2010a and 2010b) , contributing resources to campaigns, and lobbying (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Dark 2000; McDermott 2006) . In countries with a labor party, the rise of members to public office is common but in the U.S., it has not received much attention.
Approaching the question from a different angle, Sanbonmatsu et al (2009) report evidence suggestive of the importance of labor unions in supporting members' candidacies. They surveyed a sample of state legislators about their pathways to office and found that about 20 percent of Democratic and 14 percent of Republican state representatives were active in a "teachers' organization" prior to running for office the first time. Additionally, more than 20 percent of Democratic and 6 percent of Republican representatives report involvement with a "labor organization" prior to running for office. For comparison, more than 50 percent of representatives report involvement with "business or professional organizations." This suggests that involvement with professional organizations generally and labor organizations specifically are common precursors to office holding. However, without comparable measures in the population at large, it is not clear whether legislators are disproportionately active in such organizations or not. Even if they are disproportionately active, it is not clear which way causality runs. Do political aspirants tend to join organizations or do organizations help elevate their members to public office? Electing members to public office is a strategic priority for many in the labor movement. Across the country, the AFL-CIO's "Target 5000" program explicitly aims to train and to support members in attaining public office, as did its precursor "2000 in 2000" program, and as do many 
Issues at Stake
Promoting the election of union members to public office is one tactic employed by unions as part of the labor movement's broader strategy to shape public policy. Therefore, this particular role of unions is part of a larger debate about the promise and perils of union political influence.
In the pluralist political tradition, various organized interests are seen as contenders to influence policy. A healthy system is a balanced system, where no narrow segment of society exerts 8 excessive influence (Madison 1787) . Much of the controversy about union political influence in general revolves around who poses a greater risk to the health our democracy and our economy: organized labor or organized wealth. In addition to these general concerns about union political influence, this specific tactic raises some specific issues that do not apply to other parts of labor's political strategy. Three arguments in favor of this role as socially productive are described below as well, as the main arguments against it. Many of these arguments play out in campaigns when union members run for public office, as examples will illustrate.
The first argument on the positive side begins with the premise that unchecked, concentrated wealth can lead to oligarchic politics, where wealthy interests have disproportionate influence on policy and where diffuse, collective interests are underrepresented (Commons 1934 , Galbraith 1952 , Olson 1965 , Acemoglu 2008 . By organizing the resources of millions of working Americans and focusing them on policy issues, unions have been one of the most consistent, powerful forces driving for progressive or liberal public policies (Pierson and Hacker 2011) . In this, unions have been motivated by both a principled view of workers' rights and a selfinterested recognition that extending pro-labor standards to the nonunion sector through public policy makes unions easier to maintain.
Organized labor often conflicts with organized advocates of deregulation, low taxes, special breaks and protections for incumbent firms, and the rights of capital. These include the owners and managers of individual companies and federations of companies, such as Chambers of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. In addition, a long line of wealthy magnates from Jay Gould to the Koch brothers have commanded large fortunes, influenced the politics and policies of their day, and commonly clashed with labor.
In the absence of unions, workers may have a difficult time overcoming collective action problems, cooperating to pursue their shared policy interests, and serving as an effective counterweight to the capture of public policy by other concentrated economic interests. Smaller groups act to joint ends more readily than larger groups do. Smith (1776) noted this tendency in economic conflicts, "The masters, being fewer in number [than the workmen], can combine much more easily." Key (1942) , a seminal work on pressure groups, remarked, "The holders of wealth, whatever its form, have great stakes in the outcome of political struggles; they also have the time to devote to political maneuver or the money to employ others to do so. The power wielded by business in American politics may puzzle the person of democratic predilections: a comparatively small minority exercises enormous power… Labor assaults the business citadel from time to time with varying degrees of success. Yet, withal, business retains a position of potent leadership in public affairs."
Capital has another advantage in policy fights vis-a-vis labor and consumers; it is distributed very unequally and so there are wealthy individuals and corporations with large stakes in policy fights. Olson (1965) points out a subtle but very important fact: it is easier for a group to produce a collective good (i.e., a policy reform that will benefit the group) if benefits are divided unequally and there are a few actors in the group who expect to reap disproportionate benefit. Second, a legislature filled with individuals from diverse occupational and economic backgrounds may make better law than one drawn from a narrow segment. Well-off individuals disproportionately have many valuable skills that make them attractive candidates to voters.
They also have greater access to resources to support a political candidacy. However, a legislature drawn exclusively from society's upper ranks risks narrowness. Important information about life from other perspectives might not make it into deliberations (Hinsz et al 1997) . As institutions that help working and middle class Americans overcome free-riding in pursuit of their joint interests by helping members rise to elected office, unions may increase the completeness of legislative deliberations.
2 For instance, suppose there 100 firms with an interest in changing a policy. If it changes, it will raise their total profits by $100 million. Running a successful lobbying operation will cost $30 million. If the $100 million in benefits would be shared equally, they need at least 30 firms to cooperate, agree on strategy, and contribute. On the other hand, if 1 firm stands to reap $50 million and the other 99 would split the other $50 million, then the single firm that stands to reap the large gain would ensure the lobbying operation occurs.
Third, union support for members' personal development as political leaders may be valued in service to producing a vibrant democratic citizenry. Unions are not unique in supporting members' rise to political leadership in the broader community. They share this feature with many other democratically-governed institutions in society (Skocpol 2003 , Bagetta 2009 ).
Networks of faith communities play similar roles for their members and conservative candidate training schools have been especially active (Deckman 2004) . Other professional associations and networks play these roles for doctors, lawyers, scientists, or business executives. However, for people in working-and middle-class jobs, unions have been the primary organizations available centered on economic issues.
On the negative side, unions do in part use their policy influence at the expense of the public interest and unions' success in elevating members to public office may play a role in this. In this view, unions are the concentrated special interest that attempt to bend policy their way at the expense of capital, consumers, the unemployed, and tax-payers (Olson 1965 , Rose 1987 . As Reynolds (1984) put it, "Unions, continuously battling the erosion of their privileged positions, urge new political regulations and restrictions, thereby reducing both the free flow of capital and labor and the efficiency of the economy." This is an aspect of union's monopoly face (Freeman & Medoff 1984 Theoretically and politically, this concern is particularly acute regarding public-sector unions.
Public-sector unions may have a special ability to advance members' interests at the expense of the public, since they may sit across the bargaining table from political allies in elected office (Gregory and Borland 1999 
Study Design
The study is designed to rest an empirical prediction of the theory that unions help members rise to elected office. Specifically, it tests whether members of a particular occupation are more likely to hold elected office if the occupation's unionization rate is higher. To this end, I collected occupational data on all state legislators around the country. I limit my analysis to occupations that had non-negligible propensities for both (1) unionization and (2) The following linear model is used to measure the relationship between propensity to serve in the legislature and unionization rate across states indexed by s and occupations indexed by o: 6 If no professional experience was listed for particular legislators, web searches were performed to attempt to learn about legislators' professions. If this failed, the occupational indicators were assumed to be missing at random and those individuals were excluded from the analysis. Occupational shares were computed using those with any observed professional experience as the denominator. Across states, only 3.4% of legislators are missing occupational data on average.
14 Legislator shares (y os ) also likely depend on employment shares for each state-occupation (e os ).
For instance, if teachers make up a larger fraction of the adult population, teachers are also likely to make up a larger share of the legislature apart from unionization rate. Therefore, I will condition on employment share to avoid this potentially confounding factor, using measures constructed from the CPS. Employment shares are listed in the third panel of Table 1 . For instance, on average, states have 4.1 percent of their labor force working in construction.
Occupations vary in the skills required and the kinds of people they are likely to attract. By focusing on variation across states within occupations, occupational differences can be controlled. Occupation fixed effects are included to remove the influence of unobserved differences across occupations that might affect the likelihood of people in the occupation getting elected to public office (π o ). Results will also be presented for each occupation separately.
States vary in many potentially important dimensions likely to be correlated with occupational unionization rates and perhaps with the propensity to elect people from these occupations to the legislature. I use two approaches to deal with this threat to identification. First, I condition on (or control for) a variety of observable state characteristics that might influence the outcome (x s ).
These will be introduced and discussed throughout the results section but include a state's private sector unionization rate summarized in the last row of 
Results
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For each occupation, Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of states' legislator share on the vertical axis and unionization rate on the horizontal. For each occupation, the best linear fit to the 50 data points is also displayed. Each state's data points are marked with its postal abbreviation. This gives a check on data quality and illustrates some basic patterns. For K-12 teachers, Minnesota has the highest share of teacher-legislators and a high unionization rate. Louisiana and South
Carolina are low on both dimensions. In each occupation, there is a positive bivariate relationship between the two variables, such that states with higher unionization rates tend also to have higher legislator shares from that occupation. The preferences of voters differ from one state to the next in ways that could drive both unionization rates and legislator shares. In simple form, perhaps more liberal states prefer both of these (teachers to be unionized and teachers in the legislature for instance). This would cause a positive association between teachers' legislator share and their unionization rate, without any real effect of teachers' unions on teachers' electoral prospects.
Consider however that the analysis is built on teachers, police, fire fighters, and construction workers. While it is quite plausible that more taste for unions and labor legislators is correlated with voters' liberalness, tastes for electing legislators from these different occupations may be negatively correlated. In fact, as reported in Table 2, First, Table 4 presents estimates from these models for each occupation separately. The same Table 3 specifications are replicated across columns 1, 2, and 3 with one occupation in each row.
For each of the 12 regressions, the estimated coefficient on unionization rate is presented. The estimated coefficients are all positive. This suggests that the relationship found in Table 3 is not driven by one of the occupations. There is some evidence that it is present in all of them, which is consistent with the theory. Remarkably with only 50 observations, many coefficients are significant. Estimates are relatively stable as additional state characteristics are added between specifications 1, 2, and 3. Estimated coefficients are most statistically significant for police and fire fighters but largest in magnitude for construction workers in the richest specification. All point estimates are between 0.016 and 0.116.
Second, in order to boost power by pooling information across occupations while allowing for maximal flexibility for the conditioning variables, specification 4 of Table 3 allows each occupation to have its own coefficient for each explanatory variable other than the occupation's unionization rate. The coefficient on unionization is restricted to be the same across occupations -in effect capturing the average conditional association across states between legislator share and unionization rate in these four occupations. The estimate, 0.031 (0.015), remains in the narrow range obtained thus far. Because there are four coefficients estimated for each of the state-level variables and they are similar to those reported in Table 4 , they are not reported.
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Finally, in specification 5, I shift from including state-level observable conditioning variables to using state fixed effects. This specification removes the influence of all state-level influences on legislator shares that are additive and common across occupations within state. The estimated effect of union coverage rate goes up slightly, to 0.054 (0.019), the largest estimate obtained in Table 3 . One way to interpret this is that influences on legislator share that were unobserved in specifications 1-4 appear to be negatively correlated with occupational union coverage rates. In any case, the estimate is similar and plausible in magnitude.
The evidence presented here is based on cross-sectional partial correlations. However, the fall in unionization occurred in the private sector and three of the four occupations studied here are public sector. In private-sector construction, there is evidence of a similar relationship but, with only 50 observations, the estimate is imprecise. It was difficult to find legislators from other well-defined private-sector occupations. This could be driven by a real difference in the operation of this process between public-and private-sector unions. Based on theory, public-sector unions should have a stronger incentive to exert political influence than private-sector unions. With state policies on public works spending and state prevailing wage laws, one could interpret construction as, to some extent, a mixed public-private case. It could also be that workers in other private sector occupations struggle to compete for elected office at the state level but that the process operates farther down the political ladder, in service in municipal or county office.
The estimates also suggest that unions' current unionization rate of 12 percent in the economy overall is associated with about 44 additional legislators from unionized occupations compared to an economy without any unions. This is almost a change of 1 legislator per state. Since unionization is not evenly distributed across states and legislative vote margins are often narrow, the true policy impact of this change may be larger in some states that would be suggested by the average.
Views on the social value of this role of unions echo many of the larger controversies around union political power. However, there are some different aspects here. To what extent are member-legislators serving as a conduit for bringing information into the policy process that is valuable and which would otherwise be excluded versus acting as rent-seeking special interests?
Enriching formal political economy models featuring information aggregation (Piketty 1999) with correlations between electability and information content might illuminate the conditions under which this role of unions would be welfare enhancing. The debate about social value ultimately hinges on the open question of how any extra legislators from a given occupation influence policy. For instance, does having extra teachers in the legislature translate into wasteful, additional funding for education? Or, does it translate into wiser, better spending because it is more informed by practitioners' perspectives? Until these questions have firmer answers, the phenomenon of unions helping members rise to public elected office will remain a Rorschach test. Some will contemplate it and exclaim with delight, others with alarm.
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As the base of the labor movement narrows and becomes less "encompassing" (Olson 1982) , its incentives will tilt less towards acting in the broader social interest and more towards acting in its own special interests. In any case, as unions decline, no other institution seems poised to play such an active role investing in the political development of middle class, working Americans, in organizing around their economic interests, or in serving as a political counter-weight to organized wealth. Of course, plenty stand ready to seek economic rents either way. 
